Recent Australian Defamation Case Law

Executive Summary

Australian defamation case law has undergone significant transformation in recent years, spurred by a string of landmark decisions and ongoing reforms aimed at addressing the challenges of the digital era. With the rise of social media, citizen journalism, and the ease of viral content distribution, courts across the country are now regularly adjudicating complex disputes involving reputational harm in online spaces.

Within this article, our expert defamation lawyers present a focused analysis of recent Australian defamation case law, offering insights into how courts are interpreting key legal principles such as publication, serious harm, statutory defenses, and contextual truth.

Case Summary: McVicker v Nine Digital Pty Ltd [2025] QSC 110

Court: Supreme Court of Queensland

Presiding Judge: Chief Justice Bowskill

Decision Date: 26 May 2025

Citation: [2025] QSC 11

Background

In this case, the plaintiff, Mr McVicker, initiated defamation proceedings against Nine Digital Pty Ltd, alleging that three publications on the defendant's 9Finance and A Current Affair websites contained defamatory material about him. Subsequently, Nine Digital made an offer to make amends under section 17(1) of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), which Mr. McVicker accepted.

Legal Issue

The central legal question was whether, following the acceptance of the offer to make amends, Mr. McVicker was entitled to continue his defamation action against Nine Digital.

An order was made under rule 483 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) for the Court to determine the following questions, separately from, and in advance of, any other issue in the proceeding:

'(a) whether the settlement offer accepted by the plaintiff was an offer to make amends within the meaning of division 1, part 3 of the Defamation Act;

(b) what were the defendant’s obligations under the offer to make amends or, alternatively, the compromise agreement reached between the parties regarding publishing the correction or apology on the relevant websites (correction obligation);

(c) whether the defendant carried out the correction obligation;

(d) alternatively, whether the defendant repudiated the compromise agreement.'

Decision

In considering the questions, Chief Justice Bowskill found that:

'(a) Yes, the settlement offer accepted by the plaintiff was an offer to make amends within the meaning of division 1, part 3 of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld).

(b) The obligations under the agreement formed by acceptance of the offer to make amends are set out in the email of 6 May 2020. The obligations relevantly included publication of a notice headed “correction”, in the agreed form of words, on the 9Finance and A Current Affair websites (as distinct from the homepage for each website) for no less than 60 days.

(c) Yes, the defendant carried out the correction obligation.

(d) Not necessary to answer.'

Consequently, Chief Justice Bowskill held that, pursuant to section 17(1) of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), once an offer to make amends has been accepted and the terms of that offer have been carried out by the defendant, the plaintiff is precluded from maintaining defamation proceedings in relation to the matter. Accordingly, the court ruled that Mr. McVicker could not proceed with his defamation claim against Nine Digital.

Significance

This decision underscores the binding nature of accepted offers to make amends under Queensland's defamation legislation. It highlights that, once such an offer is accepted and fulfilled, plaintiffs are barred from pursuing further legal action on the same defamatory matter. The case serves as a pertinent example of how the statutory framework aims to resolve defamation disputes efficiently and prevent protracted litigation.

Consequence - McVicker v Nine Digital Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] QSC 150

Following the determination of the separate questions, on 23 June 2025, Chief Justice Bowskill made the following orders regarding the proceedings:

1. The proceeding is dismissed; and
2. The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of the proceeding:(a)on the standard basis up to and including 15 December 2023; and(b) on the indemnity basis after 15 December 2023.

Case Summary: Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (Appeal) [2025] FCAFC 67

Court: Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia

Judges: Justices Perram, Katzmann, and Kennett

Decision Date: 16 May 2025

Citation: [2025] FCAFC 67

Parties: Ben Roberts-Smith (Appellant) v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited and others (Respondents)

Background

Ben Roberts-Smith, a decorated former Australian soldier, initiated defamation proceedings against Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited and associated journalists, alleging that a series of articles published in 2018 defamed him by imputing that he committed war crimes during his service in Afghanistan. The primary judge dismissed his claims, finding that the respondents had established the substantial truth of the imputations.

Roberts-Smith appealed the decision, contending that the primary judge erred in several respects, including the application of the standard of proof and the assessment of evidence.

Legal Issues on Appeal

The Full Court considered several grounds of appeal, including:

• Did the primary judge err by placing significant weight on the evidence of the Afghan witnesses when it was unreliable (particular 20)?
• Did the primary judge err by rejecting the account of a legitimate engagement in “the official contemporaneous records” (particular 21)?
• Did the primary judge err by giving insufficient consideration to an alleged inconsistency in the evidence of Person 4 concerning the ICOM radio (particular 22)?;
• Did the primary judge err by failing to accept the evidence of Person 100 that no complaints had been made concerning war crimes at meetings in 2013 and speculating as to the reasons for his evidence (particular 23)?
• Did the primary judge err in finding that there was a high probability that, if there had been a spotter in the cornfield next to the helicopter landing zone, it would have been detected by the aerial scanning in the absence of expert evidence and when there was evidence that “scanning assets” had failed to detect insurgents on previous missions (particular 24)?
• Did the primary judge err by failing to give sufficient weight to the practice of the SASR to photograph and record PUCs and then release them or take them back to Tarin Kowt for questioning and the absence of such a record or photograph of Ali Jan, Hanifa or Mangul corroborating the claim that they had been placed under control during the mission (particular 25)?
• Did the primary judge err by taking into account the findings about the murders at Whiskey 108 and the pre-deployment training to infer that the appellant had a tendency to execute persons he thought were or were likely to be Taliban (particular 26)?
• Did the primary judge err by by taking into account the findings in relation to pre-deployment training to infer that the appellant had a tendency to use “throwdowns” to conceal an unlawful kill (particular 28)?
• Did the primary judge err by finding that the appellant’s motive for killing Ali Jan was that he would execute persons he thought were Taliban or likely to be Taliban when it was not put to the appellant and the respondents’ case was that Ali Jan was a farmer and not a member of the Taliban (particular 27)?
• Did the primary judge err by making adverse credit findings about Persons 11 and 100 on the basis that, because they were unreliable witnesses about some specific matters, they were unreliable about all matters relating to Darwan (particular 29)?
• Did the primary judge fail to properly apply s 140 and Briginshaw (particular 30)?

Decision

The Full Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the primary judge's findings. The Court held that no error has been established in the primary judge’s treatment of events at Chinartu.

The Court went on to dispose that:

'[1016] While we have detected two errors in his Honour’s reasons, those errors are immaterial. They do not affect his Honour’s conclusions on any of the critical questions. We endorse the following observations made by the respondents about his Honour’s judgment. In a long, careful and clear judgment the primary judge correctly identified and applied the relevant legal principles and paid close attention to the serious nature of the allegations and the standard of proof. His Honour repeatedly reminded himself that the respondents bore the onus of proving the substantial truth of the imputations and of the cogency of the evidence necessary to discharge it.

[1017] The burden of proving that his Honour erred on appeal rested with the appellant. The appellant has not discharged that burden. What is more, we are satisfied that his Honour’s conclusions with respect to the substantial truth of the relevant imputations conveyed by the respondents’ articles were correct.

[1018] Consequently, the appeals must be dismissed. Costs should follow the event.'

Significance

This decision reinforces the application of the Briginshaw standard in civil defamation cases involving serious allegations, such as war crimes and the implications of the substantial truth defence. It clarifies that while the presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle in criminal law, it does not inhibit a civil court from determining the truth of serious allegations based on the balance of probabilities.

The case also underscores the importance of credibility assessments by the trial judge and the deference appellate courts give to such findings.

Case Summary: Jabbie v Gbangaye [2025] WASC 73

Court: Supreme Court of Western Australia

Judge: Justice Tottle

Decision Date: 7 March 2025

Citation: [2025] WASC 73

Parties: Charlene Eminata Jabbie (Plaintiff) v Susanna Gbangaye (Defendant)

Background

This case involved a defamation claim arising from a podcast livestreamed on Facebook by the defendant, Susanna Gbangaye, a Liberian-Australian talk show host. The plaintiff, Charlene Eminata Jabbie, also of Liberian descent, alleged that Gbangaye made defamatory statements during the broadcast, which was widely viewed within the Liberian community in Australia and internationally.

The podcast discussed the murder of Janet Dweh, another Liberian-Australian woman. Jabbie's estranged husband had been arrested and charged with Dweh's murder three weeks prior to the podcast. During the podcast, Gbangaye made statements to the effect that:

• Jabbie was complicit in the murder of Janet Dweh.

• Jabbie was a violent person.

• Jabbie had harassed the victim.

• Jabbie practiced witchcraft.

Legal Issues

The primary legal issues were:

1. Defamatory Imputations: Whether the statements made by Gbangaye conveyed defamatory imputations about Jabbie.

2. Defences: Whether Gbangaye could rely on any defences under defamation law, such as truth or honest opinion.

3. Damages: The appropriate quantum of damages to be awarded if defamation was established.

Decision

Justice Tottle found in favour of the plaintiff, determining that the statements made by Gbangaye were defamatory. The court held that the podcast conveyed the following imputations about Jabbie:

• She was complicit in the murder of Janet Dweh.

• She was a violent person.

• She had harassed the victim.

• She practiced witchcraft.

All of which were grossly defamatory and were very serious in nature.

The Court rejected Gbangaye's defences, noting that she did not witness the incidents she referred to in the podcast and failed to call witnesses to support her claims. The Court held that the Gbangaye's conduct in publishing the defamatory comments about Jabbie were unreasonable and indefensible.

Justice Tottle awarded Jabbie the following damages:

• General Damages: $325,000 for non-economic loss, including harm to reputation and emotional distress.

• Damages for Economic Loss: $70,400 for economic loss, including lost income and benefits, as well as $1,260.00 for medication for depression.

Additionally, the court granted interest on the general damages at a rate of 3% from 30 October 2021 and an injunction restraining Gbangaye and her associates from making further defamatory statements about Jabbie.

Significance

This case underscores the serious consequences of making defamatory statements on social media platforms. It highlights the Courts' willingness to award substantial damages for reputational harm and emotional distress caused by online defamation.

The decision also illustrates the importance of substantiating claims made in public forums and the potential legal repercussions of failing to do so.

Case Summary: Reiter v News Corp Australia Pty Ltd & Anor [2025] VSC 54

Court: Supreme Court of Victoria

Judge: Associate Justice Goulden

Decision Date: 24 February 2025

Citation: [2025] VSC 54

Parties: Reiter (Plaintiff) v News Corp Australia Pty Ltd & Anor (Defendants)

Background

The plaintiff, Mr Reiter, initiated defamation proceedings against News Corp Australia Pty Ltd and Mr Mark Murray following the publication of an article in the Geelong Advertiser. The article alleged that Reiter had been misrepresenting himself as a lawyer and claiming associations with high-profile musicians.

Prior to publication, a journalist from the Geelong Advertiser emailed Reiter at approximately 10:00 AM, informing him of the impending story and inviting his response by 2:00 PM the same day. Reiter responded three times before the deadline, requesting a one-day extension to provide documentation refuting the claims. Despite his requests, the article was published at 3:00 PM that day.

Legal Issues

The central legal issue was whether Reiter had served a valid concerns notice as mandated by sections 12A and 12B of the Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) (and under the uniform legislation in other states) before commencing legal proceedings. The defendants contended that Reiter's failure to serve such a notice rendered the proceedings invalid and sought summary dismissal.

The Court disposed the following regarding the consequences of failing to comply with section 12B:

'[20] The clear words of s 12B of the Defamation Act restrict the commencement of a proceeding unless s 12B(1) is complied with. That restriction recognises that non compliance with ss 12A and 12B can have substantive implications for the proposed defendant, and can undermine the objectives behind these amendments to the Defamation Act. Depending on the precise failure, it would deny a defendant the opportunity to obtain further particulars of the harm suffered by the aggrieved person and, more significantly, the opportunity to make an offer of amends and to rely on the substantive defence provided in s 18.

[21] For the above reasons, the commencement of a defamation proceeding which is not permitted by s 12B has the potential to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The Court has power, including under r 23.01 of the Rules, to dismiss or strike out the proceeding issued in contravention of the statutory provision as an abuse of process.

[22] In order to be successful on this application, the defendants must persuade the Court that:

(a) none of the plaintiff’s communications was a valid concerns notice for the purposes of s 12A; and

(b) to the extent that any one of those communications was a valid concerns notice:

(i)the proceeding was not commenced in accordance with s 12B because the imputations relied upon in the proceeding were not those particularised within the valid concerns notice, if any; and

(ii) the period in which the defendants were entitled to make an offer of amends had not elapsed at the time of commencement of this proceeding on 29 March 2024.'

Decision

Associate Justice Goulden ruled in favor of the defendants, summarily dismissing the defamation proceedings on the basis that Reiter had not served a valid concerns notice. The Court found:

• Reiter's pre-publication communications, including emails and any alleged conversations with the journalist, did not constitute a valid concerns notice as they failed to specify the defamatory imputations and did not assert that the publication had caused or was likely to cause serious harm to his reputation.

• Two draft originating motions sent by Reiter post-publication also failed to meet the statutory requirements. They lacked clear identification of the defamatory imputations and did not adequately articulate the serious harm caused.

• Even if any of these documents had qualified as a valid concerns notice, Reiter did not comply with the mandatory 28-day waiting period before initiating proceedings, as stipulated by section 12B of the Act.

• That having reached the above conclusions, the proceeding is incompetent and ought to be dismissed as an abuse of process.

The Court also made an order that Reiter pay News Corp and Murrays costs of the proceedings.

Significance

This case underscores the critical importance of adhering to procedural requirements in defamation law, particularly the necessity of serving a valid concerns notice that clearly identifies the defamatory content and articulates the serious harm caused. The decision illustrates that courts will strictly enforce these prerequisites, and failure to comply can result in the summary dismissal of proceedings.

Legal practitioners and potential plaintiffs must ensure meticulous compliance with the statutory requirements for concerns notices to avoid procedural pitfalls that could jeopardise their claims.

Case Summary: Thurston v Fox Sports Australia Pty Limited [2025] FCA 54

Court: Federal Court of Australia

Judge: Justice Halley

Decision Date: 7 February 2025

Citation: [2025] FCA 54

Parties: William Thurston & Ors (Applicants) v Fox Sports Australia Pty Ltd & Ors (Respondents)

Background

In August 2020, during a National Rugby League (NRL) match between the Penrith Panthers and the New Zealand Warriors, three spectators—William Thurston, Cherokee Townsend, and Joshua Renner—were ejected from the stadium for allegedly making racist remarks towards Indigenous Australian player Brent Naden, a Wiradjuri man.

The incident was reported by multiple media outlets, including Fox Sports, Channel 7, and Channel 9. The reports varied in detail and tone, with some including live footage and commentary on the ejection.

Legal Issues

The applicants initiated defamation proceedings against the three broadcasters, alleging that the broadcasts conveyed imputations that they were racist and had racially vilified the player. The key legal issues revolved around:

• Whether the broadcasts conveyed the alleged defamatory imputations.

• Whether any defences, such as justification, qualified privilege, or honest opinion, were applicable.

Decision

Justice Halley delivered a nuanced judgment:

• Channel 7: The court held that Channel 7's broadcasts conveyed the defamatory imputations and failed to establish any valid defences. Consequently, Channel 7 was ordered to pay $200,000 in damages to each applicant.

• Fox Sports: The Court found that Fox Sports' broadcasts did convey the imputations that the applicants were racist and had racially abused the player. However, Fox Sports successfully invoked the defence of honest opinion, as the impugned parts of the broadcast were expressions of opinion rather than assertions of fact.

• Channel 9: The Court determined that Channel 9's broadcasts did not convey the alleged imputations, leading to the dismissal of the claims against it.

Justice Halley, in delivering the judgment, disposed that:

'[305] Moreover, unlike the Channel 9 broadcast and although to a lesser extent, the Fox Sports broadcast, the Channel 7 broadcasts did not report the racial vilification or abuse as racial vilification or abuse that was alleged to have been undertaken by the applicants. Rather the Channel 7 broadcasts only reported without any qualification that the “Sickening new video” showed several young men “making a series of vile racist remarks towards NRL Star Brent Naden” and that the NRL had launched an investigation after racial slurs had been “made against Panther’s Star”.'

The final order of the Court included:

• The fourth respondent (Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd) and fifth respondent (Seven Network Limited) were to pay each of the applicant's damages for non-economic loss in the sum of $200,000, in addition to interest on this amount.
• The claim against the first (Fox Sports Australia Pty Ltd), sixth (Tcn Channel Nine Pty Ltd), seventh (Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd) and eighth (Nine Digital Pty Ltd) respondent were dismissed.
• A proposal to make an order for costs (unless objections were filed) as follows:(a) applicants pay 50% of the costs of Fox Sports;
  (b) applicants pay the costs of Channel 9; and
  (c) Channel 7 and Seven Network pay the applicants costs.

Significance

This case underscores the critical importance for media organisations to exercise caution when reporting on sensitive issues such as racial vilification. The judgment highlights that:

• The context, tone, and presentation of a broadcast can significantly influence whether defamatory imputations are conveyed.

• Even when reporting on the same incident using similar footage, different editorial choices can lead to varying legal outcomes.

• Defences like honest opinion require that the impugned statements be clearly recognisable as opinions rather than assertions of fact.

For media entities, this decision serves as a reminder to ensure that reporting is balanced, accurate, and mindful of the potential reputational harm to individuals involved.

Case Summary: K. v University of New South Wales [2025] NSWDC 24

Court: New South Wales District Court

Judge: Judge Gibson

Decision Date: 7 March 2025

Citation: [2025] NSWDC 24

Parties: Mr K (Plaintiff) v University of New South Wales (First Defendant), MSS (Second Defendant) and Sarah Hessom (Third Defendant)

Background

Mr K, a student at the University of New South Wales (UNSW), initiated defamation proceedings against the university, MSS and the Ms Heesom. The dispute arose from communications and actions taken by UNSW in response to certain incidents involving Mr K.

Prior to commencing legal action, Mr K. issued a concerns notice to UNSW, alleging that specific statements made by the university were defamatory.

The UNSW made a summary dismissal application of the claims for defamation and intimidation on the following grounds:

'(a) The plaintiff is asserted to have failed to comply with the concerns notice procedure set out in s 12A of the Act, in relation to those of the publications made on or after 1 July 2021.

(b) The limitation period for the publications identified in paragraphs 37 – 39 has expired irrevocably pursuant to ss 14B and 63 of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), as more than three years have passed since publication.

(c) Time should not be extended to permit the plaintiff to bring any of the defamation claims out of time, whether the Act applies in its current form or (as is the case with the claim for the publication on 11 November 2020) under the previous legislation).

(d) An alternative claim by the third defendant that the defamation claim brought against her (paragraph 28 of the statement of claim) is an abuse of process (Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”) r 13.4).

(e) The claim for the tort of intimidation (paragraphs 30 and 36 of the statement of claim) does not plead the elements of the tort and should be struck out (UCPR r 14.28(1)).'

Mr K opposed the application and sought orders as follows:

'(a) He should be granted an extension of time for each of the 13 defamation actions set out in the statement of claim.

(b) If the claims for intimidation are bad in form, he should be entitled to replead them. (Mr Senior, on behalf of the first defendant, accepted that this was the appropriate relief, so the plaintiff’s acknowledgement of the need to replead is noted as the reason for the orders made for this claim.)'

Legal Issues

The primary legal issue centered on the adequacy of the concerns notice served by Mr K Under the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), a valid concerns notice must:

• Identify the defamatory matter (e.g., specify the location such as a webpage address).

• Set out the defamatory imputations said to arise.

• State that the publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm.

• For excluded corporations, specify the serious financial loss alleged.

UNSW contended that the concerns notice lacked sufficient particularity, rendering it invalid and despite sending a variety of purported concerns notice (incl. one that was sent 61 times), none of them were compliant.

In addition, the UNSW also further alleged that Mr K failed to comply with the concerns notice procedure, because:

• a request for further particulars pursuant to 12A(3) of the Defamation Act, was sought by the UNSW.
  
• This has the consequence of extending the 28-day period in which no proceedings can be commenced until the request was answered.
• Mr K did not respond to the request and in fact, prepared the statement of claim on the same day, then subsequently filed it by post.

Decision

Judge Gibson in making the orders, concluded the following:

[135] The plaintiff filed a notice of motion in the Registry on 18 December 2024 seeking default judgment. He was not entitled to do so, not least because the defendants were entitled to bring this application before filing any defence and because this application was fixed for hearing on 6 February 2024.

[136] The defendants were given no notice of this application for default judgment having been made. I provided them with a copy of the notice of motion during the hearing and asked the plaintiff to address me as to why it should not be dismissed. He did not make any submissions in court but more recently has complained, in correspondence to the court which has not been copied to the defendants, that the defendants should be required to file a defence notwithstanding this application.

[137] I do not propose to require the defendants to file any defence until after this application has been determined. I have accordingly included an order striking this notice of motion out as part of the orders made below.

[138] As all the defamation claims have been struck out, these proceedings will be removed from the Defamation List and sent to the General List for case management by the Judicial Registrar.

Judge Gibson made the following orders:

(1) The plaintiff’s application for an extension of the limitation period to bring proceedings for defamation for the claims in paragraphs 25 – 29, 31 – 35 and 37 – 39 of the statement of claim is refused.

(2) The plaintiff’s claims for defamation in paragraphs 25 – 29, 31 – 35 and 37 - 39 against the first and third defendants are struck out and dismissed.

(3) The plaintiff’s notice of motion filed on 18 December 2024 for default judgment is dismissed with costs and the plaintiff is stayed from making any further application for default judgment until such time as any of the defendants have failed to comply with court orders to file a defence by a particular date.

(4) The plaintiff’s claim for the tort of intimidation (paragraphs 30 and 36 of the statement of claim) is struck out with leave to replead.

(5) The plaintiff’s amended statement of claim deleting the defamation claims and repleading the tort of intimidation claim is to be filed within 28 days and to be accompanied by a Statement of Particulars conformably with UCPR r 15.12.

(6) These proceedings removed from the Defamation List and placed in the General List, with a return date of 7 March 2025 before the Judicial Registrar for a timetable, such timetable to include any orders for the filing of defences.

(7) Pursuant to UCPR r 42.20, the plaintiff is to pay the first and third defendants’ costs of this application and of the defamation proceedings.

Significance

This case underscores the critical importance of adhering to procedural requirements in defamation proceedings. The decision highlights that:

• A bare assertion of harm without factual context is insufficient.

• Failure to properly particularise a concerns notice can render it invalid.

• An invalid concerns notice bars a claimant from commencing proceedings until a compliant notice is issued and the waiting period elapses.

For potential plaintiffs, this case serves as a cautionary tale emphasising the necessity of meticulous preparation and compliance with statutory requirements when initiating defamation actions.

Case Summary: Newman v Whittington [2025] NSWSC 275

Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales

Judge: Justice Chen

Decision Date: 26 March 2025

Citation: [2025] NSWSC 275

Parties: Jasmin Newman (Plaintiff) v Adam Whittington (Defendant)

Background

Jasmin Newman, a family dispute resolution practitioner, initiated defamation proceedings against Adam Whittington, founder of a child recovery organization. The claim pertained to 12 defamatory publications made by Whittington between December 2019 and October 2021 across platforms including WordPress, Facebook, and Twitter. These publications accused Newman of unethical practices and professional misconduct, causing significant harm to her reputation.

Whittington failed to file a defence, leading the court to grant a default judgment under UCPR r16.3. Consequently, the matter proceeded to a hearing for the assessment of damages under UCPR r30.1. Interestingly, Whittington actively refused to respond or be involved with the final hearing, and sent an email stating:

“Stop wasting my time opening rubbish and tagging me into your nonsense emails. In fact, to make sure you don’t waste another minute of my time, I’ll block you from this day on.

Your scumbag client won’t get one cent. That I promise.”

Legal Issues

The court addressed several key issues:

1. Defamatory Imputations: Whether the publications conveyed the defamatory imputations as alleged by Newman.

2. Serious Harm Threshold: Assessment of whether the publications caused, or were likely to cause, serious harm to Newman's reputation, as required under section 10A of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW).

3. Extent of Publication: Determination of the reach and impact of the defamatory statements, considering the online platforms used.

4. Aggravated Damages: Evaluation of whether Whittington's conduct warranted an award of aggravated damages.

5. Injunctive Relief: Consideration of granting a permanent injunction to prevent further defamatory publications by Whittington.

Decision

Justice Chen made the following orders:

(1) Judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant in the sum of $160,000.00.

(2) Order the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings, including pursuant to s 98(4)(c) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), the amount of $147,796.00 representing fees incurred by counsel for the plaintiff.

(3) Order, pursuant to r 7.41(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (‘the UCPR’), that Robert Armitage, counsel for the plaintiff, being a barrister who has provided legal assistance to the plaintiff under the scheme for the provision of legal assistance to litigants under Division 9, Part 7 of the UCPR, is entitled to recover the sum specified in order 2.

(4) Order the gross sum costs payable by the defendant in respect of fees incurred by counsel for the plaintiff specified in order 2 (namely, $147,796.00) is to be paid:

(a) within 28 days; and

(b)to a bank account nominated by the plaintiff’s counsel, and to be advised to the defendant.

(5) Order that the defendant be permanently restrained by himself, his servants or agents from publishing or further publishing the matters complained of in these proceedings or any other matter giving rise to the imputations found in this judgment to have been conveyed by those matters (or similar imputations not differing in substance from them).

(6) Order, within 21 days from the date of these orders, the defendant to remove the publications of the 12 matters referred to in the judgment of the Court, and any other material giving rise to those imputations, from electronic platforms controlled by the defendant, those platforms including:

(a) The “WordPress site” with the name: “CARI – Child Abduction Recovery International”.

(b) The “WordPress site” with the name: “Adam Whittington”.

(c) The Facebook page with the name: “Child Abduction Recovery International”.

(d) The Facebook page with the name: “Child Abduction Recovery International CARI – Information Page”.

(e) The Facebook page with the name: “Child Abduction Recovery Australia”.

(f) The Facebook page with the name: “Adam Whittington”.

(g) The Facebook page with the name: “Adam Whittington Advocate”.

(h) The Twitter or X page with the name: “CARI – Child Abduction”.

(7) Direct that the Registrar of the Court send a copy of these reasons for judgment to the defendant.

(8) Direct that these orders be entered forthwith.

Significance

This case underscores several critical aspects of Australian defamation law:

• Serious Harm Requirement: It reinforces the necessity for plaintiffs to demonstrate that defamatory publications have caused, or are likely to cause, serious harm to their reputation, even in cases of default judgment.

• Online Defamation: The decision highlights the challenges in quantifying the reach of online defamatory statements and the court's willingness to consider the broader impact through the grapevine effect.

• Aggravated Damages and Injunctions: The case illustrates the court's readiness to award aggravated damages and grant injunctive relief in situations where defendants exhibit defiance and continue to publish defamatory material.

This case serves as a pertinent example of the courts' approach to online defamation, the application of the serious harm threshold, and the remedies available to plaintiffs in the digital age.

Conclusion

Australian defamation case law is rapidly evolving, particularly as digital communications, social media, and the 24-hour news cycle challenge traditional legal principles. The recent cases analysed- spanning public interest defenses, procedural compliance, and the “serious harm” threshold-demonstrate that both plaintiffs and defendants must approach defamation disputes with a clear legal strategy and thorough understanding of statutory requirements.

From Roberts-Smith’s high-profile appeals to grassroots social media disputes such as Jabbie v Gbangaye, courts across Australia are reinforcing the need for procedural rigor, credible evidence, and respect for reputational rights. Whether you’re a public figure, a journalist, a private citizen, or a corporate entity, navigating the defamation landscape requires legal expertise and proactive advice.

Staying informed on how courts interpret and apply defamation laws is essential for mitigating risk and protecting your reputation.

Why Choose Odyssey Legal for Defamation Matters?

At Odyssey Legal, we offer more than just legal advice-we provide a reputation protection strategy backed by experience, integrity, and outcomes.

Here’s why clients choose us:

• Proven Track Record in both prosecuting and defending defamation claims across Australia.

• Expert Defamation Lawyers who stay ahead of legislative changes, judicial trends and stay up to date with relevant case law.

• Digital Defamation Experts adept at handling cases involving social media, online publications, and cyber-libel.

• Compliance First Approach - we ensure your case complies with strict procedural requirements such as valid concerns notices and serious harm thresholds.

• Client-Centric Service -clear communication, tailored advice, and strategic support every step of the way.

Your reputation is your most valuable asset-let Odyssey Legal help you defend it.

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Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

1. What qualifies as defamation under Australian law?

Defamation occurs when a published statement harms a person’s reputation by exposing them to hatred, contempt, or ridicule. The statement must be defamatory, published to at least one other person, and identify the plaintiff-either directly or indirectly.

2. What is a 'concerns notice' and why is it important?

A concerns notice is a formal letter required under the Defamation Act 2005 before initiating court proceedings. It identifies the defamatory material, the imputations alleged, and allows the publisher to respond or offer amends. Without a valid concerns notice, your case may be dismissed.

3. What is the 'serious harm' threshold in defamation?

Introduced through the 2021 reforms, this legal test requires plaintiffs to prove that the defamatory publication caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to their reputation (or serious financial loss in the case of excluded corporations). It applies in all Australian states except Western Australia and the Northern Territory (as of mid-2025).

4. Can I sue someone for defamation over a Facebook or social media post?

Yes. Australian courts have confirmed that defamatory statements published online-on platforms like Facebook, Twitter, or podcasts-are actionable if the legal elements of defamation are satisfied. Several recent cases, such as Jabbie v Gbangaye, involved social media posts.

5. What defences can be used in a defamation claim?

Common defences include (without limitation):

• Truth (Justification): The statement was substantially true.

• Honest Opinion: It was an expression of opinion, not fact.

• Public Interest: The publication was in the public interest.

• Qualified Privilege: The statement was made on an occasion that warrants protection (e.g., legal, political, or employment contexts).

6. How much compensation can I receive for defamation in Australia?

Damages depend on the severity of harm, publication reach, and presence of aggravated factors, including (without limitation):

• General damages (for hurt and reputation damage);

• Special damages (for economic loss);

• Aggravated damages (for malicious or persistent conduct).